The speed of the disintegration said  everything. It took less than 48 hours for London to descend from  self-styled capital of the world into a circuit of burning dystopian hells. The speed of BlackBerry messaging; the speed of kids on BMXs; the speed of Molotovs and petrol. Never mind the police, even the media couldn’t keep up.
In a country that takes order for granted, the speed meant a  free-fall back to fundamentals, not just in an obvious Hobbesian sense,  but in a way that made events feel more real. If you wanted to know if  your neighbourhood was next, there was no point watching the riots on  television, it was quicker to listen out for breaking glass and burglar  alarms; sirens if you were lucky. There wasn’t much time for disbelief.
Crucially, life was more real for the looters. That much was clear to anyone on a sofa at home, switching on their flatscreen TV to watch footage of people stealing flatscreen TVs. And as that footage was beamed around the world, the images had their own kind of psychic velocity: a short-cut to viewers’ unconsciousness provided by Britain’s rich tradition of fictional visions of dystopia, from George Orwell’s 1984 to Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, William Golding’s Lord of the Flies and of course anything by JG Ballard.
But following a week in which buildings and communities burnt the colour of A Clockwork Orange,  this year’s prize for late literary prophet clearly belongs to author  Anthony Burgess. With its depiction of a lawless Britain, where the  police command neither confidence nor deference and residents live in  fear of feral youth empowered by their own vernacular, the parallels in  Burgess’s novel are instructive.
While the speed of this week’s events gave Britain’s urban descent  the feel of inevitability, commentators grappled with contradictory  pop-socioeconomic theories over its origins. The shooting of a black man  by the police sparked the original protest, but it morphed into  something that had little to do with multicultural meltdown. When the looters were finally unmasked,  their social diversity made it even more difficult to decipher  motivations. The only certainty was that politicians would credit the  perpetrators with whatever agenda most conveniently suited their own  ideological programmes – from the left’s concerns about an economic  underclass, to the right’s focus on plain and simple criminality.
In A Clockwork Orange, by contrast, Burgess captures his  delinquent protagonists’ complete lack of political motivation, but  without dismissing their actions as simple opportunism. Numbed by the  dullness of their existence, Alex and his gang of “droogs” revel in  demonic violence to stave off the demon of boredom. The only way for  them to feel alive is to be literally “alive and kicking”. For Burgess  there is nothing paradoxical about an apathetic rampage.
Likewise, many rioters in London and other cities were laughing as  they looted. The speed of the destruction was partly a function, then,  of their sheer exuberance – the opposite of stereotypical listlessness  more commonly known as “chillaxing”. Like football hooliganism, the  violence was recreational – a day out in a Nietzschean theme park. This  was a key difference between this week and previous flashpoints in  Britain’s potted history of public disorder.
Another much-discussed difference was the role of consumerism. In  place of the traditionally anti-capitalist stance of previous youth  counter-cultures came reports of rioters in low-end fashion retailers,  engaged in the new practice of “trying before you loot”. This form of  extreme consumerism meant that, by the end of the week, the biggest  bogeyman was our culture of rampant materialism and instant  gratification. In a consumer society, identities are constructed from  owning things. But the widespread sense of self-entitlement revealed by  the riots also betrays a broader fetishism of objects. Some of Britain’s  urban centres are so atomised that it is now easier to connect with  things than with people. Likewise, digitally reduced attention spans  have also contributed to a culture of superficial “bling”.
Despite being published in 1962, A Clockwork Orange is  uncannily critical of these trends. Unlike today’s youth, Alex has no  love of bourgeois comforts. Perhaps more revealingly, some critics  suggest his ultra-violent campaign is an elaborate form of self-harm. He  knows his actions will have consequences and is subconsciously seeking  castigation. Certainly his parents won’t rein him in.
Even if this does not apply to this week’s looters – who appeared to  believe that they could not and would not be punished – the argument  still leaves us with a parallel. As with the disaffected youth who set  the suburbs of Paris alight in 2005, the first buildings and cars to  burn in London were not in the resented districts of the rich, but those  in the perpetrators’ own communities. So not only was there no  discernible political agenda to improve their lot (save for a few  fleeting material possessions), the rioters were actually destroying  their own. David Cameron, the prime minister, acknowledged as much when  he warned them that they were wrecking their own lives.
Self-destruction is more dystopian even than nihilism. Not only does  it imply hopelessness, it suggests this week’s rioters are cut off not  just from society, but also from themselves. In A Clockwork Orange, Burgess illustrates this by naming one of Alex’s victims “Alexander”. The idea is taken further in the film Taxi Driver,  when the protagonist Travis Bickle utters the immortal “Are you talkin’  to me?” monologue while pointing his gun at his own reflection in the  mirror.
As in fiction, so in reality: just because the violence across  Britain’s streets seemed to have no meaningful target, it doesn’t follow  that it wasn’t directed at anything.
The writer is an FT journalist and author of the novel ‘Londonstani’ 

 
 
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