Netanyahu’s Challenge
The Israeli Prime Minister takes apart the looming Iran
deal.
WSJ Editorial, March 3, 2015
President Obama thought so little of Benjamin Netanyahu ’s
speech to Congress Tuesday that he made clear he hadn’t watched it and said the
text didn’t “offer any viable alternatives” to the Administration’s pending
nuclear deal with Iran. We’ll take that presidential passive-aggression as
evidence that the Israeli Prime Minister’s critique was as powerful as Mr.
Obama feared.
For all the White House’s fretting beforehand about the
speech’s potential damage to U.S.-Israel relations, Mr. Netanyahu was both
bipartisan and gracious to Mr. Obama for all he “has done for Israel,” citing
examples previously not publicly known. But the power of the speech—the reason
the Israeli leader was willing to risk breaking diplomatic china to give it—was
its systematic case against the looming nuclear deal.
Point by point, he dismantled the emerging details and
assumptions of what he called a “very bad deal.” The heart of his critique
concerned the nature of the Iranian regime as a terror sponsor of long-standing
that has threatened to “annihilate” Israel and is bent on regional domination.
The Administration argues that a nuclear accord will help
move the revolutionary regime toward moderation. But Mr. Netanyahu spent some
15 minutes laying out the regime’s historical record. Since Hasan Rouhani
became president in 2013, Iran’s internal repression has become worse than in
the days of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . Iran has doubled down on its military support
for Bashar Assad in Syria, gained control of north Yemen through its Houthi
militia proxies, and continued to arm Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and
Shiite militias in Iraq.
Mr. Netanyahu noted that the pending deal would lift the
economic sanctions that have driven Iran to the negotiating table. “Would Iran
be less aggressive when sanctions are removed and its economy is stronger?” Mr.
Netanyahu asked. “Why should Iran’s radical regime change for the better when
it can enjoy the best of both worlds: aggression abroad, prosperity at home?”
These are good questions that the Administration should be obliged to answer.
The Prime Minister also rightly raised doubts about whether
even an intrusive inspections regime could guarantee enough notice if Iran
seeks to divert its nuclear capabilities to build a bomb. North Korea agreed to
inspectors in a deal with the Clinton Administration, he noted, only to oust
them years later and build its nuclear arsenal: “Here’s the problem: You see,
inspectors document violations; they don’t stop them.”
He also zeroed in on the deal’s acceptance of Iran’s already
robust nuclear infrastructure, coupled with a 10-year sunset provision after
which Iran could enrich as much uranium in as many centrifuges as it likes. To
appreciate the scope of this concession, recall that the Administration and U.N.
Security Council demanded that Iran “halt all enrichment activities” in a
resolution adopted in 2010.
The Administration now says that it can’t plausibly forbid
Iran from having some enrichment capability. But the only alternative to zero
enrichment isn’t the major capacity the White House is now prepared to concede
to Tehran. Such a capability makes it easier for Iran to cheat on any agreement
it signs. The sunset provision also means that Iran can simply bide its time to
build an even larger nuclear capacity.
“Iran could get to the bomb by violating the deal,” Mr.
Netanyahu said, and it could also “get to a bomb by keeping the deal.”
Mr. Netanyahu was especially effective in rebutting the
Administration’s claim that the only alternatives at the current moment are Mr.
Obama’s deal—or war. This is the familiar false choice—his way or disaster—that
has become a hallmark of the President’s political argumentation.
But Mr. Netanyahu said there is a third choice—negotiate a
better deal. He pointed out that sanctions had driven Iran to the negotiating
table when oil was $100 a barrel and it would be under greater pressure now
when oil is closer to $50. For all of its fanaticism and ambition, Iran is
still a relatively weak country under great economic pressure. The U.S. has
leverage to drive a harder bargain if it is willing to use it.
Mr. Netanyahu hinted that he could still accept some kind of
agreement, despite attempts to portray him as opposed to any concessions. But
the Prime Minister made clear in particular that any sunset provision would
only be acceptable if it hinged on a change in Iran’s behavior.
“If the world powers are not prepared to insist that Iran
change its behavior before a deal is signed, at the very least they should
insist that Iran change its behavior before a deal expires,” he said to a
standing ovation.
Given Mr. Obama’s reaction, the Prime Minister knows his
real audience is Congress and the American people. His speech raised serious
doubts about an accord that has been negotiated in secret and which Mr. Obama
wants Americans to accept without a vote in Congress. Now maybe we can have a
debate worthy of the high nuclear stakes.
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